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3.1 Introduction
A front page article of the Wall Street Journal in November 2005 de-
scribes the way that Microsoft’s four-year-old Irish subsidiary, Round Is-
land One Ltd., allows the parent company to save at least $500 million in
taxes each year (Simpson 2005). By licensing its software for use in Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa through the Irish subsidiary, Microsoft re-
ceives royalty payments that are deductible in high-tax locations and sub-
ject to a low rate of corporate income taxation in Ireland. Because the earn-
ings are retained abroad, they are not subject to a residual U.S. tax.
According to company ﬁlings with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Simpson reports that other technology companies are following a
similar strategy to reduce their overall tax burden.
Such reports are an indication of major changes over the past ten years
in the tax planning strategies of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs).
These changes have aﬀected the likelihood that a U.S. parent will receive
royalties from its foreign aﬃliates or that the parent will be able to increase
its earnings abroad from exploiting intangible assets that it develops in the
United States. Additionally, U.S. parents have found new ways to accom-
plish the relocation or migration of intangible assets abroad. These new
strategies have implications for the way the return to U.S. research and de-
velopment (R&D) is reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as
well as any incentive to relocate innovative activity outside of the United
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tant tax regulations to create these new strategies, and it examines how
they appear to have inﬂuenced measures of MNC activity reported by the
U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and
the National Science Foundation.
One important tax planning development was the issuance of the
“check-the-box” regulations by the IRS in 1997, which greatly simpliﬁed
the use of hybrid entities. These are operations that are classiﬁed as incor-
porated subsidiaries by one country and transparent branches by another.
As explained in section 3.2, this distinction allows U.S. MNCs to avoid im-
mediate taxation of intersubsidiary payments that otherwise would occur
under the antiabuse Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) provisions of
subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code. Hybrids can make such intersub-
sidiary payments invisible to the U.S. Treasury. As a result, MNCs can re-
tain earnings abroad in low-tax locations.
A second element of the successful tax-saving strategies that accomplish
the transfer of intellectual property abroad is that an aﬃliate can acquire
the rights to a valuable intellectual property at a favorable price. A tax
haven entity can engage in a cost-sharing agreement with the parent in
which it shares in the cost of an R&D project in exchange for the right to
exploit the technology abroad. Once the technology is developed the tax
haven company can license an operating sibling in a high-tax location, but
with a hybrid structure the deductible royalty paid to the tax haven will not
be subject to immediate U.S. tax. Companies have apparently been able to
arrange favorable cost-sharing agreements that permit them to leave
abroad in a low-tax location a greater share of the return to the U.S. R&D.
If this strategy is widely adopted, the growth in royalties received by U.S.
parents can be expected to decline, and earnings retained in the tax haven
company will grow. The popularity of cost-sharing agreements combined
with hybrid structures also suggests that there will be an increase in pay-
ments for technical services by U.S. subsidiaries to their parents relative to
royalties. In the long run, however, the sum of these service payments
should decline relative to foreign direct investment income abroad as more
of the return to U.S. intangible assets is in the form of net income deferred
abroad in low-tax locations.
The chapter assesses these predictions empirically at two levels, one us-
ing data aggregated to the country or worldwide level, and one examining
ﬁrm-speciﬁc practices. Verifying whether the determinants of aﬃliate roy-
alty payments have been aﬀected by this new tax-saving strategy also is rel-
evant in addressing a potential policy issue in tax reform. In November
2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform recom-
mended two possible reform plans. One was termed the Simpliﬁed Income
Tax, whose provisions in the international area would exempt from U.S.
tax any dividends received from active business income abroad. The for-
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dend income would never be subject to U.S. tax, such a change would be
likely to reduce royalty payments made to U.S. parents; royalties would
continue to be fully taxed under the rationale that they are a deductible ex-
pense abroad.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds by ﬁrst providing a fuller expla-
nation of hybrid structures and cost-sharing agreements. It then examines
evidence from IRS and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data to de-
termine whether the strategies suggested previously can be detected either
in data aggregated to the country level or in ﬁrm-speciﬁc data. For both
levels of empirical analysis several measures are quite consistent with the
predictions already described.
3.2 Alternative Ways of Utilizing a Hybrid Structure to 
Aﬀect Payments for Technology
The United States taxes the worldwide income of its residents, but allows
a credit for foreign income taxes paid on income received from abroad. Al-
though any residual U.S. tax is deferred until active business income is
repatriated to the United States, for some types of income a U.S. tax is due
immediately. Hybrids are a business structure that allows U.S. ﬁrms to
avoid having income treated in that latter category. To understand the sig-
niﬁcance of hybrids, ﬁrst consider the role of the CFC rules that otherwise
would apply to transactions between related parties. A recent Treasury
document (2000, xii) states the following:
The subpart F rules attempt to prevent (or negate the tax advantage
from) deﬂection of income, either from the United States or from the for-
eign country in which earned, into another jurisdiction which is a tax
haven or which has a preferential tax regime for certain types of income.
Thus, subpart F generally targets passive income and income that is split
oﬀ from the activities that produced the value in the goods or services
generating the income. Conversely, subpart F generally does not require
current taxation of active business income except when the income is of
a type that is easily deﬂected to a tax haven, such as shipping income, or
income earned in certain transactions between related parties. In related
party transaction, deﬂection of income is much easier because a uniﬁed
group of corporations can direct the ﬂow of income between entities in
diﬀerent jurisdictions.
[. . . ]Generally, rents and royalties earned by a CFC in an active busi-
ness are excluded from Foreign Personal Holding Company Income
(FPHCI). This exception does not apply, however, if the CFC’s rents or
royalties are received from a related person. Accordingly, rents and roy-
alties received from a related person are generally treated as FPHCI,
without regard to the nature of the business activities of the CFC that
give rise to the rents and royalties.
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transactions that aﬃliates might make, because of the belief that the for-
mer can be more easily manipulated to shift income from one jurisdiction
to another. The CFC rules might be regarded as a backstop to transfer
pricing regulations that attempt to limit income shifting practices. If pay-
ments between related parties cannot be observed by the U.S. Treasury,
however, an MNC can avoid this subpart F treatment. Note that this resid-
ual tax is important to U.S. MNCs whose foreign tax payments are less
than the U.S. tax liability on that foreign income. For companies that have
substantial excess foreign tax credits, there is little incentive to create a hy-
brid to avoid U.S. taxation of royalty income, because that income already
would have been shielded from any additional U.S. tax.
To illustrate the potential beneﬁt from a hybrid arrangement, consider
an example where a parent capitalizes a hybrid entity in a tax haven with
equity, and then has it lend to an operation in a high-tax location. The
MNC reports to the high-tax jurisdiction that the tax haven aﬃliate is a
corporation, but it tells the U.S. Treasury that the tax haven aﬃliate is an
unincorporated branch of the high-tax subsidiary. The high-tax subsidiary
receives a deduction for the interest paid to the tax haven aﬃliate, but from
the U.S. Treasury’s perspective the two aﬃliates are treated as one consol-
idated company. The interest income received in the tax haven is not re-
ported to the U.S. Treasury and can therefore be deferred from current U.S.
tax. Without the hybrid, a payment to a tax haven ﬁnance subsidiary would
be subject to current U.S. tax under the CFC rules.1 Altshuler and Grubert
(2005) calculate that these types of structures allowed U.S. multinational
companies to lower their foreign taxes by $7.0 billion per year in 2002 com-
pared to 1997.
Figure 3.1 shows a hybrid structure applicable in the technology setting
considered here, which allows the low-tax aﬃliate to strip out income from
the high-tax aﬃliate through royalty payments that are a deductible ex-
pense in the high-tax country. From the perspective of the high-tax coun-
try, less income will be declared by the aﬃliate that operates there, and the
host government will have collected less tax revenue. The royalty income is
not recognized by the U.S. Treasury and can be retained in the low-tax
country where it escapes a current U.S. tax.
Similar beneﬁts may arise under other hybrid structures, although the
way such beneﬁts will be reported to the U.S. Treasury changes. For ex-
ample, an aﬃliate in a high-tax country A may claim for U.S. tax purposes
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1. A tax law change in 2006 makes it possible for a ﬁrm under certain circumstances to
achieve this same tax-saving result without a hybrid structure. Under the Tax Increase Pre-
vention and Reconciliation Act signed into law on May 17, 2006, which is scheduled to apply
through 2008, CFCs can avoid the subpart F treatment explained previously if the intersub-
sidiary payments of dividends, interest, rents, and royalties are attributable to active business
income, in contrast to passive income.that a related aﬃliate in a low-tax country B is its branch, and therefore the
latter entity becomes invisible to the U.S. Treasury. If the high-tax aﬃliate
in country A pays a royalty to the low-tax aﬃliate in B, it is not recognized
by the U.S. Treasury. The consolidated net income of the high-tax aﬃliate
rises because the royalty is deducted against a high tax rate, but the higher
income now earned by the low-tax aﬃliate can be retained in B and need
not face the higher tax rate in A. The country A aﬃliate appears more prof-
itable because the tax burden on a given dollar of income is now lower.
In the case of R&D cost-sharing agreements, a key issue is the basis on
which the aﬃliate is allowed to buy in to successful research carried out by
the parent. If a parent’s latest innovation builds on several previous gener-
ations of research, but the aﬃliate is able to pay a favorable price that
places little value on those past expenditures, the strategy is particularly
successful in allowing a migration of the intangible asset to the location
abroad. New proposed regulations under the cost-sharing provisions of
Section 482.7 of the Internal Revenue Code (Reg-144615-02, announced
for public comment on August 29, 2005) are intended to address the “in-
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Fig. 3.1 A possible hybrid structureappropriate migration of intangibles.” These proposed regulations have
been revised in response to comments, but as of January 2008, they still are
not ﬁnalized. Initial reactions to them suggest that they represent a major
revision, which is more likely to require that such agreements reﬂect a price
that would be oﬀered in an arms-length transaction to an investor who
bore none of the risk of the earlier product developments. Under the less
explicit current regulations, U.S. parents have been able to achieve the out-
come that a smaller ownership share of successful technological innova-
tions is retained in the United States, and fewer royalties will be received by
the parent in the future. While payments from the aﬃliate for technical ser-
vices under the cost-sharing agreement will result in an initial increase in
parent receipts, over the longer run the parent will receive fewer payments
for the utilization of its intangible assets abroad either in the form of roy-
alties or in the form of cost-sharing payments.
3.3 Indications of the Changing Importance of 
Royalty Payments at the Aggregate Level
3.3.1 U.S. Treasury Data
As previously indicated, the U.S. Treasury receives tax returns from
U.S.-controlled foreign corporations, which provide information about
royalty payments, payments for technical services, and CFC earnings.
Table 3.1 is based on compilations of information from the Form 5471,
which is ﬁled with the basic corporate return and reports on each con-
trolled foreign corporation’s transactions with its related parties. The table
compares the values reported in 1996, before the check-the-box regime was
adopted, and 2002. The latter year is the latest one for which these data are
available. Because some of the hybrid arrangements and cost-sharing
agreements already described may take time to design and implement, a
longer time frame generally is desirable to allow more complete adjustment
to these new tax-saving opportunities. Over a longer time frame, however,
the actual response observed may be aﬀected by other policy changes or by
changes in the business cycle. For example, due to the economic downturn
that occurred in many parts of the world in 2002, the likely shift in aﬃliate
earnings relative to royalty payments may be less pronounced than in years
that represent comparable stages of the business cycle.
The summary measures in the top portion of table 3.1 indicate how in-
come for all aﬃliates has changed relative to the income declared in seven
major low-tax countries. The share of earnings in the latter group grew
much more rapidly than total earnings and proﬁts of all U.S. subsidiaries,
as shown on lines 1 and 2. Although part of the increase in low-tax coun-
tries is due to the growth in dividends received from other CFCs (not hy-
brids), shown on line 3, the remaining portion shown on line 4 reﬂects in-
116 John Mutti and Harry Grubertcreased real activity and the eﬀect of tax planning structures that leave the
visible aﬃliate in a low-tax country. That ﬁgure increases at double the rate
of the overall growth in aﬃliate income, an outcome consistent with the
tax-saving strategies previously outlined.2
Lines 5 and 6 show further evidence of hybrid structures in which the
high-tax company disappears from the perspective of the U.S. Treasury.
The rate of growth in tangible capital in ﬁve low-tax countries that serve as
attractive locations for holding companies is over six times as great as for
the total of all CFCs. Tangible capital reported in these ﬁve countries rep-
resents about 18 percent of the total in 2002. However, the tangible capital
need not be physically present in those countries, because it instead can be
located in the invisible branch in a high-tax country.
The bottom three lines of the table are based on transactions among re-
lated parties reported by the 7,500 largest CFCs. Of the three measures
shown, payments to U.S. parents for technical and management services
grew most rapidly (by 108 percent), a likely indication of the rising impor-
tance of cost-sharing agreements. Earnings and proﬁts grew less than roy-
alties paid to the parent, 41 percent compared to 68 percent. That result is
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Table 3.1 Tabulations from the 1996 and 2002 Form 5471 ﬁles (in billions of dollars)
1996 2002 Growth as %
All CFCs
1. Total pretax earning and proﬁts $160.8 $228.7 42
2. Earnings and proﬁts in seven major low-tax countries 
(Ireland, Singapore, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.) 36.5 82.5 126
3. Dividends received in the seven major low-tax countries 6.4 25.7 302
4. Earnings and proﬁts in the seven major low-tax 
countries, less dividends received 30.1 56.8 89
5. Total tangible capital (net plant and equipment 
plus inventories) 767.5 1,119.5 46
6. Tangible capital in ﬁve major holding company low-tax 
countries (Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland) 51.7 205.0 296
Top 7,500 CFCs
7. Earnings and proﬁts 139.8 196.8 41
8. Compensation for technical and management services 
(cost-sharing) 13.2 27.4 108
9. Royalties paid to parents 22.4 37.6 68
Source: Treasury tax ﬁles.
2. This outcome applies to the case where the remaining entity seen by the U.S. Treasury is
located in the tax haven country. If the remaining entity were located in a high-tax country in-
stead, the contrast cited in table 3.1 would not be as great. Evidence for that latter strategy
would appear as a lower eﬀective tax rate in the high-tax country, a situation examined by Alt-
shuler and Grubert (2005).somewhat unexpected, if the combination of a hybrid and a cost-sharing
agreement makes royalty payments from high-tax aﬃliates invisible to the
U.S. Treasury.
To put this observation in perspective, however, consider two factors
that are more supportive of the hybrid strategy’s importance. First, the rel-
ative ranking of royalties and proﬁts for 2002 may result because earnings
are more cyclically volatile than royalties, and 2002 was a year in which
earnings and proﬁts declined from their 2000 peak. By way of contrast,
royalties grew less rapidly than earnings over the period 1996 to 2000.3Sec-
ond, between 2000 and 2002 the Treasury data show that royalties received
by U.S. parents increased 29 percent, whereas the BEA’s international
transactions ﬁgures indicate that royalties received by U.S. parents only
grew by 5 percent between those same years. Such ambiguities suggest the
importance of considering multiple data sources to indicate MNC re-
sponses to the changing tax incentives.4
3.3.2 Bureau of Economic Analysis Data
The Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes two important sources of
data on aﬃliate operations. One is the Annual and Benchmark Surveys of
Direct Investment Abroad, which presents ﬁnancial and operating data
offoreign aﬃliates. Greater detail is available in the case of majority-owned
aﬃliates (MOFAs). A second important source of information comes from
the U.S. international transactions accounts. These data lie behind the cal-
culation of the direct investment position. However, they only consider the
transactions of foreign aﬃliates with their U.S. parents and do not provide
any basis for analyzing transactions among aﬃliates.
The surveys of ﬁnancial and operating data oﬀer the advantage that in-
formation is collected for each aﬃliate, regardless of whether it operates as
a branch or is incorporated in the foreign country. In contrast to the Trea-
sury data, the disappearance of aﬃliates under a hybrid arrangement
should not occur in the BEA data. Nevertheless, care is warranted in in-
terpreting these data, too, because certain measures of aﬃliate activity,
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3. Changing composition of this group also may inﬂuence these comparisons. Because the
largest 7,500 aﬃliates are selected based on their reported assets, this set includes more capi-
tal-intensive operations, such as ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate. Based on income or re-
ceipts, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and construction would play a larger role.
Throughout the 1990s these latter industries have declined in relative importance (Nutter
2001).
4. A further example of the diﬀerence between Treasury tax data and BEA data comes
from looking at total royalty payments reported by U.S. corporations on Form 1118, the ba-
sis for claiming a foreign tax credit. In 2000, ﬁrms claimed royalties of $75 billion. In the BEA
international transactions data, total royalties received by all U.S. residents was $43 billion.
The MNCs may have a bigger tax incentive to characterize payments received from abroad as
royalties, because that increases the foreign source income they receive and thereby increases
the foreign tax credits they can claim (see Mutti and Grubert [1998] for discussion of the
eﬀects of diﬀerent source rules).such as net income, may appear overstated due to double counting.5 If net
income is likely to be overstated, but royalties are not, then comparing the
percentage changes in each of these items will not be a valid test of the
ﬁrm’s response to the tax incentives previously identiﬁed.
For example, if a MOFA in country A receives a dividend from a MOFA
in country B, the U.S. parent will report the aﬃliate’s earnings in country
B and also the remitted dividend as part of the income of the aﬃliate in
country A. The sum of income across all MOFAs will appear larger be-
cause of this double counting. As holding company operations expand,
and fulﬁll the role of the country A MOFA in the previous example, the po-
tential double counting becomes larger. While the trend toward greater use
of holding companies can be observed from the 1980s onward, the shift
from 1996 to 2004 is particularly large. As reported by Koncz and Yorga-
son (2005), the portion of the U.S. direct investment position abroad that
they account for has roughly doubled, from 17 percent to 34 percent.6
In contrast, the direct investment income ﬁgure from the international
transactions account does not include the double counting that can occur
with the ﬁnancial and operating data. Because it only records transactions
between a U.S. parent and its foreign subsidiaries, it is not aﬀected by
transactions among aﬃliates.
Those observations serve as useful background to interpret alternative
measures of the operations of foreign aﬃliates reported in table 3.2. The
table shows relevant data by which to assess changes in earnings and roy-
alties from benchmark surveys from 1989, 1994, and 1999. Annual survey
data are available for 2003, but those data do not provide a complete rep-
resentation of transactions among aﬃliates. The royalty payments and
other private direct investment service payments for that year are taken
from the international transaction accounts.
First consider the implications of the changes observed from 1994 to
1999, the benchmark years that span the introduction of the check-the-box
opportunity. Then examine whether those trends are reinforced by addi-
tional responses to those incentives in the subsequent 1999 to 2003 period
or whether other factors that operate over that period oﬀset the initial re-
sponses observed. Also, consider how these patterns diﬀer from those ob-
served in the earlier benchmark intervals from 1982 to 1989 and 1989 to
1994.
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5. See Borga and Mataloni (2001), and Altshuler and Grubert (2005) for presentation of
this issue. Altshuler and Grubert were interested in how much tax saving was possible through
the growth of payments that presumably were deductible in high-tax locations, in contrast to
payments of dividends from one aﬃliate to another.
6. Luxembourg has been a particularly attractive location, because it exempts from cor-
porate tax the dividends, interest, and royalties received from a foreign source by the holding
company. Exemption systems more typically do not tax dividends received from abroad, be-
cause they have born a corporate tax in the host country, but do not exempt payments that
were deductible abroad.The BEA data indicate that over the 1994 to 1999 period, royalties paid
by aﬃliates to U.S. parents grew by 50 percent, a rate faster than some in-
dicators of MNC activity (such as sales, gross product, employment, and
R&D) but not as fast as several other measures such as income, property,
plant and equipment, and payments to the parent for other private direct
investment services. Comparing royalty payments to aﬃliate income re-
quires careful attention to the distinctions raised previously, and therefore
two measures for income are included in the table. The ﬁrst is based on the
sum of before-tax income reported by all MOFAs (which can include
double counting described previously). The second is based on the direct
investment return to U.S. parents (which should be free from the double
counting) adjusted upward by the amount of foreign income tax paid. The
increase in the former ﬁgure is particularly large, probably a reﬂection of
the growth of holding company operations. The increase in the latter ﬁgure
still is greater than that of royalty payments to the parent over the 1994 to
1999 period that spans the introduction of check-the-box regulations.
To give greater insight into the conﬂicting forces that inﬂuence the roy-
alty ﬁgure, note that in the earlier 1989 to 1994 period royalties grew quite
rapidly at a time when the growth in income was very slight. As explained,
the opportunity to receive royalties free of any residual U.S. tax occurs
when the U.S. parent has excess foreign tax credits. While the U.S. Tax Re-
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Table 3.2 Aspects of aﬃliate activity from BEA benchmark survey measures (1989–1994,
1994–1999) and ﬁnancial and operating data /international transactions
accounts (2003)
Growth, Growth, Growth, 
1989–1994 1994–1999 1999–2003 
Measure 1989 1994 1999 2003 (%) (%) (%)
1. Aﬃliate net income before tax 105.4 110.4 207.8 396.9 5 88 91
2. Before-tax direct inv. income 86.6 87.6 145.2 247.8 1 66 71
3. Property, Plant and Equipment 248 350 593 730 41 69 23
4. R&D 7.0 11.9 18.1 22.3 70 52 23
5. Gross product 320 404 566 705 26 40 25
6. Employees 5,114 5,924 7,766 8,364 16 31 8
7. Sales 1,020 1,436 2,219 2,906 41 55 31
8. Royalties paid 12.5 22.0 35.8 — 76 63 —
9. Royalties to U.S. parent 9.8 16.7 25.0 30.9 70 50 18a
10. Royalties to other foreign 
aﬃliate 1.5 2.6 6.0 — 73 131 —
11. Other direct investment 
services to parent 7.1 11.8 20.6 27.0 66 75 22a
12. Income/sales (line2/line 7) 8.5 6.1 6.5 8.5 — — —
13. Royalties/(royalties   income) 
line 9/(line 9   line 2) 10.2 16.0 14.7 11.1 — — —
aBased on change in international transactions accounts entries for 1999 and 2003.form Act of 1986 reduced the U.S. corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34
percent, and caused an initial increase in the share of U.S. parents that were
in excess credit positions, that initial consequence was not a permanent
change. Companies adjusted the types of payments they made and host
countries reduced their corporate tax rates (Grubert, Randolph, and
Rousslang 1996). Nevertheless, the incentive to pay additional royalties
continued to operate into the 1990s. There was substantial public com-
mentary over various iterations of proposed regulations that would spec-
ify what royalty methods could be used under the provisions of 1986 act,
and the standard that emerged when those regulations were ﬁnalized in
1994 was more stringent than existed prior to 1986. Companies likely ad-
justed their practices before 1994 in anticipation of such a change. Also, in
1993 penalty regulations were adopted, which applied if royalties were un-
derstated. In short, there were several policy changes that could be ex-
pected to create increasing pressure to raise royalty payments over the 1989
to 1994 period.
While the rate of increase of royalty payments by aﬃliates to parents was
slower in the 1994 to 1999 period, the growth rate of payments to other
aﬃliates increased sharply by 131 percent, the largest increase shown in
table 3.2. Relative to the royalties paid to the parent, the proportion paid
to other aﬃliates rose from 15 percent to 24 percent. This pattern is con-
sistent with the rising role of hybrid structures and the payment of royal-
ties from high-tax aﬃliates to low-tax aﬃliates. Finally, parent receipts of
other direct investment service payments rose faster than royalties, 75 per-
cent versus 50 percent from 1994 to 1999. The larger increase in direct in-
vestment service payments is a pattern consistent with the rise of cost-
sharing agreements in the Treasury data.
A particular advantage of the BEA data is that they show distinctions by
country of origin of these payments by aﬃliates. The summary ﬁgures in
tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 demonstrate that the pattern of royalty payments is
sensitive to tax incentives. From 1994 to 1999 a particularly large increase
occurred in royalty payments to U.S. parents from aﬃliates in Ireland and
Singapore, as shown in table 3.3. In the case of Ireland, over the earlier ﬁve-
year period (1989 to 1994), its share of all royalties received by U.S. parents
from their MOFAs rose from 2.2 percent to 5.1 percent, but in the more re-
cent period (1994 to 1999) that proportion increased to 15.0 percent. In the
case of Singapore, the corresponding changes were from 1.6 percent to 3.2
percent and then to 4.6 percent.
This pattern of payments suggests that U.S. parents have found it prof-
itable to locate intellectual property in low-tax countries, and from the ad-
ditional revenue received there to pay additional royalties to the U.S. par-
ent. This strategy will be particularly attractive if only a portion of the
additional revenue is paid to the U.S. parent, and the rest is retained in the
low-tax country. In the case of Ireland, royalties as a share of net income
Eﬀect of Taxes on Royalties and Migration of Intangible Assets Abroad 121more than doubled from 1989 to 1994, but then only increased slightly
from 1994 to 1999. In 1994 before-tax income per dollar of sales, net of
earnings from equity investments in other foreign aﬃliates was more than
three times higher for Irish aﬃliates than for the average across all aﬃliates.
Before the advent of check-the-box, U.S. parents already had found it at-
tractive to shift proﬁts to Ireland. Although that diﬀerential did not in-
crease between 1994 and 1999, a substantial increase in the absolute
amount of proﬁts occurred. For Irish aﬃliates, there was a threefold in-
crease in before-tax equity income, whereas the increase for all other aﬃli-
ates was 73 percent. For evidence of the operation of hybrids, note that
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Table 3.3 U.S. parent transactions with majority-owned aﬃliates
2003
1989 1994 1999 International 
Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark  transactions 
III.X.1 III.Z.1 III.AA.1 data
Royalties, received from aﬃliate 9,839 16,744 25,045 30,876
Europe 6,373 10,627 d 16,784
France 993 1,428 1,777 1,639
Germany 1,166 2,019 1,950 1,873
Ireland 216 859 3,761 4,065
Netherlands 652 1,397 d 1,566
Switzerland 259 446 d 1,614
United Kingdom 1,487 1,873 2,270 2,739
Asia 2,287 3,991 5,732 8,099
Japan 1,435 2,242 2,864 3,061
Singapore 158 542 1,150 2,385
Canada 1,011 1,123 1,746 2,584
Latin America and other Western 
Hemisphere 138 929 d 3,167
All other 30 74 296 242
Royalties, paid to aﬃliate 54 368 2,200 2,550
Europe 43 270 d 1,365
France 9 26 70 193
Germany 6 43 25 d
Ireland d 4 16 21
Netherlands 0 20 d d
United Kingdom 25 56 151 176
Asia 7 58 170 d
Japan 1 25 73 92
Singapore 1 2 19 d
Canada 4 — 113 153
Latin America and other Western 
Hemisphere 0 0 d d
All other 0 0 6 36
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1998, table III.X.1; 1994, table III.Z.1; 2004, table III.AA.1).
Note: d denotes suppressed for disclosure reasons.royalty receipts from high-tax countries such as France, Germany, or
Japan have either declined or grown at rates much slower than the average.
Those aﬃliates may still be paying royalties commensurate with their ex-
panding sales, but they are not paying them to the U.S. parent, a conse-
quence of hybrid structures being created.
In the case of royalty payments from one MOFA to another, disclosure
limitations mean that the large increase in payments to other MOFAs
shown in table 3.4generally cannot be assigned to speciﬁc countries. More
rapid growth in payments from high-tax countries might be expected on
average. Disclosure limitations also make it impossible to show whether
the largest increases in royalties received occurred for aﬃliates in low-tax
countries.7
Consider an alternative standard to apply in assessing how MNC royalty
receipts have changed over time: compare those received by MNCs as a
share of all royalties received in the United States.8For the two benchmark
years that span the 1986 tax reform, which resulted in many more MNCs
having excess foreign tax credits and the opportunity to receive royalties
free of any residual U.S. tax, the share of royalties received from related
parties jumped from 67 percent in 1982 to 77 percent in 1989. From that
peak, however, the ratio decreased to 72 percent in 1994, and it continued
to decrease to 69 percent in 2003 and 63 percent in 2006. The continuation
of the downward trend, long after the share of MNCs in an excess credit
position had returned to earlier values, is consistent with later tax policy
changes such as check-the-box.
Regarding the rapid increase in payments for other direct investment
services (such as cost-sharing agreements), the receipts by U.S. parents do
not show the same dominant position for Ireland and Singapore as ap-
peared in the case of royalties received by U.S. parents. Payments from
those countries did grow at an above-average rate from 1994 to 1999, but
the current values still represent a small share of the total. Note, however,
that the combination of cost-sharing agreements and hybrids means that a
location where real production occurs, such as Ireland or Singapore, is no
longer necessary to relocate intangible assets. A cost-sharing agreement
with an aﬃliate in the Cayman Islands, for example, which then licenses a
branch in Germany to produce using the technology acquired, will accom-
plish the desired migration of the intangible to a low-tax location. Consis-
tent with that new opportunity, payments from holding country destina-
tions such as the Netherlands and Switzerland hardly rose at all. Of
particular signiﬁcance is the table 3.5 entry for the “Other Western Hemi-
sphere,” which includes Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. For these coun-
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7. The fact that such disclosure problems are reported for Ireland does seem surprising,
given the anecdotal evidence cited at the outset over the large number of companies estab-
lishing aﬃliates there.
8. We thank Mihir Desai for suggesting this comparison.tries there is a fourfold increase in payments to U.S. parents between 1994
and 1999, while the overall rate of increase is only 75 percent.
Cost-sharing agreements take time to design and implement, and the
1994 to 1999 observation period may simply not allow enough time for this
inﬂuence to be more signiﬁcant than the other determinants of such activ-
ity. Extending the observation period, however, may introduce other con-
124 John Mutti and Harry Grubert




Total 1,461 2,581 9,241
From aﬃliated persons 710 1,464 6,456
from U.S. parent 54 368 2,200
from other foreign aﬃliates 656 1,096 4,256
Europe 462 799 d
France 31 45 173
Germany 44 314 725
Ireland d d d
Netherlands 66 76 105
Switzerland 87 87 106
UK 117 234 928
Asia 127 254 251
Japan d d 65
Singapore d d 8
From unaﬃliated 750 1,116 2,785
Royalties paid
Total 12,472 22,039 35,846
by Europe 7,871 14,708 19,949
by Ireland 469 1,496 4,640
by Asia 2,574 4,641 8,889
by Singapore 76 555 2,844
To aﬃliated persons 11,327 19,358 31,073
to U.S. parent 9,839 16,744 25,045
to other for aﬃliates 1,488 2,615 6,029
by Europe 938 2,153 d
France 188 118 242
Germany 130 d 725
Ireland 251 d 395
Netherlands 82 537 d
UK 127 187 578
by Asia 157 249 2,216
Japan 68 105 205
Singapore d 75 d
To unaﬃliated 1,145 2,681 4,773
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1992, table III.J.7; 1998, table III.J.7; 2004, table
III.I.7).
Note: d denotes suppressed for disclosure reasons.founding factors, beyond the question of cyclical performance mentioned
previously. In the table 3.2 observations for 1999 to 2003, the item that
stands out most sharply is the growth of direct investment income. Over
that same period, the share of foreign earnings distributed to U.S. owners
steadily fell, from 49 percent in 1999 to 30 percent in 2003 and 22 percent
in 2004. While such a strategy is consistent with the incentives previously
explained, the trend undoubtedly was inﬂuenced by expectations of a
change in U.S. tax law that would treat such retained earnings more favor-
ably. Such an opportunity arose in 2004 when the U.S. Congress phased out
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Table 3.5 U.S Parent transactions with majority-owned aﬃliates
2003
1989 1994 1999 International 
Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark  transactions 
III.X.4 III.Z.4 III.AA.3 data
Other direct investment services, received 7,101 11,780 20,600 26,960
Europe 3,981 6,133 10,143 14,016
France 235 737 1,000 1,470
Germany 431 673 1,589 1,811
Ireland 121 316 738 1,299
Netherlands 412 1,236 1,246 1,473
Switzerland 166 510 506 872
United Kingdom 1,733 1,681 3,187 4,773
Asia and Paciﬁc 902 2,167 4,369 5,641
Japan 246 554 1,220 1,893
Singapore d 490 1,103 734
Canada 1,590 2,455 3,507 3,691
Latin America and other Western 
Hemisphere 347 763 2,222 2,577
All other 281 372 359 1,035
Other direct investment services, paid 3,810 6,477 14,939 18,605
Europe 1,938 3,521 8,472 11,234
France 290 529 715 826
Germany 479 644 767 1,153
Ireland d 48 335 336
Netherlands 197 186 269 536
Switzerland 74 155 233 324
United Kingdom 600 1,514 4,915 6,263
Asia and Paciﬁc 1,085 1,753 3,262 4,065
Japan 881 1,119 765 1,301
Singapore d 152 1,025 458
Canada 267 473 942 1,149
Latin America and other Western 
Hemisphere 292 457 1,129 1,811
All other 228 273 480 346
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1992, table III.X.4; 1998, table III.Z.4; 2004, table III.AA.3).
Note: d denotes suppressed for disclosure reasons.the Extraterritorial Income Regime for taxing export income, given unfa-
vorable rulings against it by the dispute resolution panels of the World
Trade Organization. Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act,
which also reduced the U.S. tax rate on qualifying dividends from MNC
operations abroad for a period of one year from the statutory rate of 35
percent to 5.25 percent. Figures for 2005 indicate that ﬁrms repatriated $33
billion more than the entire direct investment earnings for that year, re-
sulting in a reduction in the amount of retained earnings abroad. At the
same time, payments to U.S. parents in the form of royalties and other di-
rect investment services both rose less rapidly than other measures of aﬃli-
ate activity, such as gross output, sales, or property, plant and equipment.
These large changes in MNC behavior demonstrate why there is a limited
window over which aggregate responses can be expected to reﬂect a domi-
nant role for cost-sharing agreements and hybrids alone.
3.3.3 BEA and NSF Measures of Research and Development
A ﬁnal issue to address at the aggregate level is the possible role of tax
considerations in the location of R&D. Although the U.S. transition to a
knowledge-based economy accelerated over the latter half of the 1990s, in
terms of the operations of aﬃliates abroad, table 3.2 shows that the increase
in R&D performed abroad did not keep up with the growth in property,
plant and equipment. The tax incentives for shifting R&D abroad are not
straightforward. In a high-tax location the R&D would receive a valuable
current deduction, as in the United States, but any income, including royal-
ties, would be subject to the same high tax. If the company had reason to be-
lieve that the R&D project was likely to be very proﬁtable, it might locate it
in a tax haven because the value of the current deduction would become less
important. This could be combined with a hybrid structure to facilitate the
payment of royalties to the tax haven. On the other hand, the cost-sharing
structure described may make the actual shift of R&D unnecessary.
The BEA measures of R&D performed by aﬃliates and by parents are
reported in tables 3.6 and 3.7. The ratio of these two values is shown for two
diﬀerent measures, one on line 3 based on the published ﬁgures measured
in U.S. dollars at current exchange rates, and one on line 4 based on an ad-
justment of the numerator to take account of changes in the real exchange
rate that may aﬀect the amount of research that can be performed for a
given dollar expenditure. (See, e.g., National Science Foundation [2005]
for a discussion of this issue.) The ﬁrst set of ﬁgures suggests a small in-
crease in the proportion of research activity carried out by aﬃliates. The
adjustment for purchasing power parity (PPP) indicates that this increase
has been somewhat larger, because the dollar was undervalued in 1994
compared to 1999. In that situation a given foreign currency expenditure
in 1994 translated into more dollars and a higher ratio of aﬃliate eﬀort on
126 John Mutti and Harry Grubertline 3, even though the real amount of R&D work accomplished was not
correspondingly larger.
The BEA data allow some breakdown of these ﬁgures by country. Two
groupings are shown in table 3.6, one that reports R&D performed by
aﬃliates in the four most important sites (France, Germany, Japan, and the
United Kingdom), and one that reports R&D performed in six low-tax
countries (Luxembourg is excluded from the group used in table 3.2, be-
cause in most years this entry cannot be disclosed). The share accounted
for by the top four countries shown on line 6 has dropped, as R&D eﬀorts
of U.S. ﬁrms have been dispersed more broadly across the globe. At the
same time line 8 shows that there is no marked increase in the share of R&D
performed in low-tax countries, which would have been more likely if U.S.
ﬁrms found that was the best way to ensure that future innovation of highly
proﬁtable ideas could be attributed to aﬃliates in such low-tax countries.
The absence of such a response suggests that U.S. ﬁrms have found other
ways to shift intangibles to those countries, such as the combination of hy-
brids and favorable cost-sharing agreements, which are more eﬀective than
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Table 3.7 Performance of R&D outside the United States by U.S. companies and
their foreign aﬃliates
Location 1995 1999 2001
Total 13,052 16,765 17,869
Four major countries 5,367 7,260 5,809
Ratio, line 2/line 1 .411 .433 .325
Source: NSF, Research and Development in Industry (table A-12, various issues).
Table 3.6 BEA measures of R&D performed by parent and majority-owned
aﬃliates, 1994–2003
Line 1994 1999 2003
1. Parent 90,913 126,291 140,103
2. Aﬃliate 11,877 18,144 22,328
3. Ratio, line 2/line 1 0.131 0.144 0.159
4. Ratio, adjusted for PPP 0.114 0.131 0.152
5. Six low-tax countries 1,170 1,287 1,752
6. Ratio, line 5/line 2 .099 .071 .078
7. Four major countries 7,509 10,352 11,168
8. Ratio, line 7/line 2 .632 .571 .500
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1998, table III.L.1 and III.J.1; 2004, table III.M.1
and III.J.1); Mataloni (2005).
Notes: Low-tax countries are Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda,
and the Cayman Islands. Major countries are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Japan.carrying out R&D in countries that lack appropriate infrastructure or have
limited personnel available to carry out such work.
The annual National Science Foundation (NSF) surveys give the share
of total industrial R&D performed abroad by U.S. companies. The value
for R&D abroad is smaller than the BEA number previously reported, and
the value for R&D performed domestically is higher, given that it is not re-
stricted to the value performed by U.S. corporations that have foreign aﬃli-
ates. Therefore, the ratios calculated here are lower than those from the
BEA calculated previously. Figure 3.2 shows the comparable ratios for un-
adjusted and PPP-adjusted R&D eﬀort by aﬃliates abroad relative to do-
mestic R&D based on these data. The unadjusted series is quite volatile
and exhibits no clear trend. The adjusted series is much more regular, and
the trend line suggests that if the initial value of the series is 8.6 percent, the
annual increase in this value will be slightly less than a tenth of a percent-
age point.
The NSF data oﬀer a limited breakdown by the country where the R&D
is performed. Although no geographic detail was provided in 1994, infor-
mation is given in 1995, which can be compared to similar information in
1999 to examine whether the patterns in this compilation mirror the trends
shown in the BEA data. A somewhat diﬀerent picture emerges, because for
the same four large countries, their share of the total actually rises over 
the time that check-the-box was introduced, from 41 percent to 43 percent.
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Fig. 3.2 NSF measures of R&D performed abroad relative to domestic R&D,
nominal and adjusted for purchasing power parity
Source: NSF, Research and Development in Industry, various issues, and IMF, real eﬀective
exchange rate for the United States, based on unit labor costs.Such a pattern again indicates that other strategies to promote the migra-
tion of intangibles must be more attractive.
The lack of a signiﬁcant response by U.S. MNCs to perform more R&D
in low-tax locations may suggest that the combined strategy of a hybrid
and a favorable cost-sharing agreement have kept more R&D activity at
home. Because the lack of response also could reﬂect a situation where de-
cisions on the location of real R&D activities are not very sensitive to tax
factors, the evidence here does not have an unambiguous interpretation.
Studies by Hines (1993) and by Bloom, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen (2002) do
report signiﬁcant response internationally in the way ﬁrms locate their
R&D activities, especially in the long run. To the extent that their ﬁndings
can be generalized, the higher return to domestic R&D possible with the
strategies outlined previously does make domestic locations more attrac-
tive and increase R&D activity in the United States.
3.4 Returns to Intangibles and Aﬃliate Payments at the Firm Level
Prior research at the country level indicates that the location of property,
plant and equipment became more sensitive to host country tax rates in the
1990s than it was in the 1980s (Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon 2001).
Does a similar result hold for intangible capital in the more recent decade?
Unfortunately, measuring intangible capital is not straightforward.9 This
chapter attempts to infer its migration through the examination of aﬃliate
royalties, cost-sharing payments, and earnings and proﬁts, based on ﬁrm-
level, tax return data accessed at the U.S. Treasury Department. A cross-
section of all foreign manufacturing aﬃliates in 1996 and 2002 provides the
basis for comparing how the determinants of these payments have changed
across years when a major change in tax policy occurred. This analysis
does not suggest new theoretical approaches in explaining aﬃliate earn-
ings and repatriations. Rather, standard models in the literature are applied
to the data available for the two years previously identiﬁed.10 The focus is
not on the absolute size of the coeﬃcients obtained, but instead on the rel-
ative importance of variables that determine aﬃliate earnings and pay-
ments to parents for royalties and for technical services.
In contrast to the country aggregates already presented, a particular ad-
vantage of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc data is that it is possible to control for charac-
teristics of the parent ﬁrm and the aﬃliate when observing the aﬃliate’s
transactions. Additionally, because parent ﬁrms report the earnings and
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9. Examples of more comprehensive attempts to measure intangibles are analyses by Hall
(2001) through stock market valuations and by Cummins (2005) from analysts’ proﬁt projec-
tions. For approaches that create a stock measure of R&D from annual ﬂow measures, see
Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) and the paper by McNeil (2006), both of which must assume an
appropriate rate of depreciation of intellectual property.
10. See, for example, Grubert (1998, 2001, 2003).proﬁts (E&P) of each aﬃliate—and the E&P calculation is based on in-
come as deﬁned in the U.S. tax code, not the host country—making com-
parisons across countries is more straightforward in this data set. Aside
from the beneﬁts of consistency, the E&P measure is an approximation of
ﬁnancial book income. The Form 5471s ﬁled for each aﬃliate and the re-
lated parent corporate tax return, Form 1120, are the basis for the ﬁrm-
level analysis.
With respect to important parent characteristics, a prime goal is to ac-
curately represent the intangible assets that a parent has developed. Ex-
penditures for advertising and R&D are two potentially important mea-
sures. The R&D measure comes from the research and experimentation
tax credit claimed by the U.S. parent. This credit is restricted to research
expenditures made within the United States, and the tax code speciﬁes the
ways in which such expenditures must diﬀer from routine product mainte-
nance and production. The parent’s R&D intensity, measured as a share of
sales, indicates its ability to contribute valuable technology to the aﬃli-
ate.11 This ratio, which is based on parent sales rather than assets, is gener-
ally more appropriate because it avoids errors in measurement caused by
the valuation of assets at their historical book value.
In addition to the two parent characteristics that indicate the likely mag-
nitude of intangible assets, two dummy variables represent the age of the
aﬃliate. Younger aﬃliates might be expected to show a lower rate of return
than those that are better established, although this inﬂuence of age may
be oﬀset by more recent aggressive strategies to locate intangibles in at-
tractive tax locations.
3.4.1 Empirical Results
Table 3.8 presents estimates based on such data from 1996. A key point
to observe is that in 1996 the return abroad to the exploitation of U.S. R&D
appears to favor the U.S. parent, because the coeﬃcient for the parent
R&D per dollar of parent sales variable is 25 percent greater in the equa-
tion estimated to explain royalties per dollar of aﬃliate sales than in the
equation to explain earnings and proﬁts per dollar of aﬃliate sales (0.70
compared to 0.56). In the 2002 data the comparable coeﬃcient in the roy-
alty equation is now less than 60 percent of the value obtained in the earn-
ings and proﬁts equation (0.24 compared to 0.45). A larger share of the
gain from parent technology appears to be received abroad, where it can
be retained free of U.S. tax, rather then being remitted to the U.S. parent.
Also noteworthy is the importance of the parent R&D variable in the re-
gression for technical service payments, an indicator of cost-sharing agree-
ments. If those payments are compared to royalties, the coeﬃcients in the
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11. Current R&D expenditures serve as a proxy for the parent’s stock of R&D or intellec-
tual property (IP) from which higher aﬃliate earnings might be expected.1996 estimates indicate twice as great a role in determining royalty pay-
ments (0.70 compared to 0.35), whereas in 2002 those proportions had
nearly reversed, with the coeﬃcient in the cost-sharing equation now ap-
pearing much larger (0.24 compared to 0.41). While that comparison may
appear exaggerated because of the major change in importance of parent
R&D in the case of royalty payments, a similar comparison with the esti-
mated coeﬃcient from the equation for aﬃliate earnings and proﬁts shows
the rising importance across these two years of cost-sharing payments to
compensate a parent for its contribution of valuable intellectual property.
These results are consistent with what the hybrid plus cost-sharing strat-
egy suggests. A potential concern may be that the simpliﬁed model used to
estimate the relevant coeﬃcients for the three diﬀerent dependent variables
may be distorted by omitted variable bias.12 To address important aspects
of that concern, consider the additional estimates reported in table 3.9.
The royalty equation shown in column 2 includes two additional vari-
ables important in tax-planning strategies, the host country’s statutory tax
rate, and the parent’s overall foreign tax rate on all dividend income re-
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Table 3.8 Determinants of CFCs proﬁts, royalties, and technical service payments from Form
5471, U.S. Treasury data
1996 2002
Proﬁt/ Royalty/ Cost share/ Proﬁt/ Royalty/ Cost share/
sales sales sales sales sales sales
Age   5 years 0.0197 –0.0163 0.0042 –0.0004 –0.0015 0.0304
(2.27) (–4.23) (1.41) (–0.03) (–0.32) (6.17)
Age 5–15 years 0.0215 –0.0041 –0.0015 0.0455 –0.0007 –0.0036
(3.77) (–1.60) (–0.78) (4.21) (–0.17) (–0.86)
Parent 0.556 0.697 0.346 0.4510 .236 .4100
R&D/sales (3.45) (9.77) (6.25) (3.06) (4.36) (7.24)
Parent 0.599 0.0581 0.0613 1.5530 –0.0637 –.0654
Advertising/sales (9.06) (1.99) (2.71) (9.84) (–1.10) (–1.08)
Constant .0585 0.0088 0.0015 0.0488 0.0151 –0.0055
(14.44) (4.92) (1.07) (5.87) (4.96) (–1.71)
Adjusted R2 0.062 .062 0.028 0.150 0.018 0.096
Number observations 1,640 1,640 1,640 861 861 861
Note: t-statistics shown in parentheses.
12. Another concern may be the fact that many aﬃliates make no royalty payments, and
these zero values may make ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates less desirable than alter-
native approaches, such as tobit estimation or the Heckman two-step procedure. Because the
proportion of aﬃliates that pay royalties to the U.S. parent is roughly the same in each year,
(42 percent in 1996 and 45 percent in 2002), the extent of the bias from this truncation is likely
to be comparable for the two years. The eﬀect of the shrinkage from 1996 to 2002 in the num-
ber of manufacturing aﬃliates included in the sample is not clear.ceived (as calculated from its Form 1118 to claim a foreign tax credit). The
role of the statutory rate is ambiguous. To review the comments made ear-
lier in the chapter, a parent may have an incentive to pay high royalties from
a high-tax host country to beneﬁt from the fact that they are a deductible
expense. Yet a parent may choose to locate valuable intangibles in low-tax
countries in order to beneﬁt from the low taxation of its proﬁts. Even if the
aﬃliate pays less than an arm’s-length royalty, total royalty payments from
a low-tax country may be higher. The importance of such an eﬀect in Ire-
land and Singapore, where actual production might occur, was shown in
the aggregated BEA data reported in table 3.3. Due to the existence of hy-
brids, the eﬀect also can occur in other low-tax locations, where an aﬃliate
owns a portion of the intellectual property that it licenses for use elsewhere.
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Table 3.9 Additional evidence of manufacturing CFCs’ royalties and technical
service payments from Form 5471, U.S. Treasury data, 2002
Royalties/ Royalty/ Cost share/ Cost share/ Cost share/
sales sales sales salesa sales
Age   5 years –0.0023 –0.0075 0.0310 –0.0002 0.0072
(–0.47) (–1.62) (6.27) (–0.07) (1.47)
Age 5–15 years –0.0013 –0.00009 –0.0044 –.0058 –0.0058
(–0.32) (–0.02) (–1.07) (–2.05) (–1.49)
Parent R&D/sales .241 .249 .4238 0.4130 0.365
(4.66) (4.66) (7.51) (10.64) (6.75)
Parent –0.0685 –0.095 –.0660 –0.0017 –0.0836
advertising/sales (–1.17) (–1.71) (–1.09) (–0.03) (–1.29)
Aﬃliate assets/sales 0.0011 — –0.0034 — —
(0.95) — (–1.11) — —
Local statutory tax rate — –0.127 — — —
— (–6.86) — — —
Foreign tax rate on — 0.093 — — —
dividends — (6.65) — — —
Ireland — — — 0.0461 0.068
— — — (5.73) (5.55)
Singapore — — — 0.0044 0.0030
— — — (0.59) (0.22)
Pure tax havens — — — 0.0424 0.143
— — — (9.31) (15.71)
Manufacturing — — — 0.0018 —
— — — (0.72) —
Constant 0.0139 0.0316 –0.0043 –0.0059 –0.0058
(4.24) (3.81) (–1.28) (–2.62) (–1.95)
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.120 0.103 0.164 0.345
Number observations 849 848 848 1,393 756
Note: t-statistics shown in parentheses.
aIncludes all sectors except ﬁnancial aﬃliates.The outcome that more royalties will be paid from low-tax countries is con-
ﬁrmed in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc data, too, because the coeﬃcient on the statu-
tory tax rate is negative.
Firms are more likely to pay royalties when they can be shielded from
taxation in the United States. The foreign tax rate paid or deemed paid on
dividends received from all foreign aﬃliates is a potential indicator of a
parent’s likelihood of having excess foreign tax credits that would eliminate
a residual tax due on repatriated royalties. Royalties, which are deductible
abroad and only bear a (usually low) withholding tax in the host country,
can absorb excess credits originating with highly taxed dividends. In 2000,
67 percent of royalties were shielded by credits. The positive coeﬃcient on
this variable is consistent with tax optimizing behavior of U.S. ﬁrms, as a
higher tax rate applied on foreign dividends creates a larger shield to re-
ceive royalties.13 These tax-planning variables are of interest in their own
right, but the key point to observe is that while adding them to this regres-
sion does raise its overall explanatory power, the coeﬃcient for parent
R&D is hardly aﬀected at all.
In the case of payments for technical services, a particularly noteworthy
extension is to consider whether certain host countries have been more
likely to attract such activity. Country dummies are included to represent
low-tax countries where future product development could take place (Ire-
land and Singapore), as well as tax havens where the most important mo-
tive would appear to be the migration of existing intangibles (Bermuda, the
Cayman Islands, and Luxembourg). While such dummies were not signif-
icant in 1996, in 2002 the coeﬃcients for Ireland and for Bermuda, the
Cayman Islands, and Luxembourg (the pure tax havens) both were quite
signiﬁcant and quantitatively very large. The importance of Ireland
substantiates the anecdotal evidence cited in the introduction to the chap-
ter. The importance of the pure tax havens suggests that the amount of real
activity expected in the host country need not be great, and a shift of R&D
activity out of the United States need not be made in order to accomplish
the migration of intangibles. Those patterns appear both in the column 4
results based on all aﬃliates (not just those in manufacturing) and in the
column 5 results based on just those aﬃliates in manufacturing. In the lat-
ter case, however, the role of activity in the pure tax havens is particularly
large. Again, including the dummies adds to the explanatory power of the
estimated equation, but it has little eﬀect on the importance of the parent
R&D variable.
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13. While the tax rate on foreign dividends may not be predetermined entirely indepen-
dently of a ﬁrm’s planned royalty payments, it generally is the source of any excess foreign tax
credits, and it is not aﬀected by other adjustments a ﬁrm may make in determining its foreign
tax credit position. Therefore, it is a better exogenous variable than the ex post excess credit
position of the parent.3.4.2 Possible Implications
The strategies identiﬁed in this chapter have already altered and are
likely to continue to alter the way returns to U.S. intellectual property are
reported in the future. Relative to previous practice, royalties received by
U.S. parents will be smaller and income from direct investment abroad will
be larger, but more of that income will be retained abroad to take advan-
tage of the deferral of any U.S. tax liability. In addition, the way that in-
come is allocated across countries can be expected to change more than the
physical location of production.
A very rough characterization of the potential shift can be calculated
from the royalties received by U.S. parent MNCs. Suppose royalties were
to continue to account for the same share of direct investment income (plus
royalties) that was observed prior to check-the-box regulations, which was
16 percent in the BEA data for 1994 and also for the Treasury data in 1996.
Applied to the data for 2003 reported in table 3.2, that ratio implies royal-
ties would have been $44.6 billion, rather than $30.9 billion, or an under-
statement of $14 billion. If that number were inﬂated by the continued
growth of royalties reported in the balance of payments through 2006, that
understatement could have risen to $20 billion. If the ﬁrms taking advan-
tage of this strategy indeed were the ones who would have owed a residual
tax in the United States, then this practice has tax revenue implications.
From the standpoint of interpreting changes in the proﬁtability of U.S.
technology, measured as direct investment income per dollar of sales, a
portion of the rising proﬁt rate may represent merely a shift in how the re-
turn to technology is being reported. In the 2003 ﬁgures reported in table
3.2, that adjustment would reduce the line 12 proﬁt rate from 8.5 percent
to 8.1 percent.
While these adjustments are not inconsequential, the greatest diﬀerence
occurs in considering the impact across host countries. When most of this
adjustment is concentrated in a small number of small countries, the con-
sequent impact on GDP attributed to those countries can be much larger.
The BEA reports the value added of U.S. MOFAs as a percentage of GDP
for host countries such as Ireland (18.5 percent) and Singapore (15.0 per-
cent), but not for the Cayman Islands or other pure tax havens. Several bil-
lion dollars attributed to those countries, if similarly recorded by their na-
tional income accountants, would raise skepticism over the reported
growth in GDP and lead economists to pay more attention instead to gross
national income (GNI).
With respect to the location of real activity, the strategy results in less in-
centive to relocate R&D activity outside the United States, because the in-
tangible assets created can emigrate. Production that utilizes the technol-
ogy made possible by U.S. R&D will more likely occur outside of the
United States and in high-tax host countries. For example, if an aﬃliate
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then a residual U.S. tax would have been paid, a disincentive to produce in
Germany. If the German aﬃliate becomes a branch of an aﬃliate in the
Cayman Islands, then production in Germany becomes more attractive,
because the tax burden in Germany is reduced by the payment of a royalty,
but there is no additional tax on that royalty in the Cayman Islands. To the
extent that aﬃliates in low-tax countries pay a smaller share of their total
returns as royalties, they gain less from this strategy.
3.5 Conclusions
Substantial migration of intangible assets from the United States to for-
eign countries appears to have occurred over the last decade. That trend
has been facilitated by the ability of U.S. ﬁrms to create hybrid entities in
their aﬃliates abroad and to reach favorable cost-sharing agreements with
them. This strategy was particularly encouraged by the U.S. adoption of
check-the-box regulations in 1997, which resulted in intersubsidiary pay-
ments between aﬃliates incorporated in one foreign country and their
branches operating in another foreign country becoming invisible to the
IRS.
An expected result is that there will be more rapid growth of earning and
proﬁts in foreign aﬃliates relative to the royalties they pay to U.S. parents,
as companies have an incentive to retain proﬁts abroad in low-tax coun-
tries where they can avoid any residual U.S. tax. Although that pattern was
observed in aggregate Treasury data over the 1996 to 2000 period, for the
longer 1996 to 2002 period royalties grew more rapidly than aﬃliate earn-
ings and proﬁts, a possible reﬂection of the cyclical nature of earnings and
proﬁts. Payments by aﬃliates to U.S. parents for technical services, as
would be called for under cost-sharing agreements, have increased rapidly
even through the longer 2002 observation period. In the process of certain
aﬃliates becoming invisible to the U.S. Treasury, aﬃliates in low-tax coun-
tries with little potential to produce goods and services now claim major
increases in their plant and equipment, presumably an indication of the
capital held by their branches in high-tax countries.
The BEA data, which retain the identity of individual establishments
even if they are part of a hybrid structure, show more than double the
growth of royalty payments from one aﬃliate to another compared to the
growth in royalty payments to the U.S. parent. Such a trend might not be
so surprising if there had been a major shift in R&D out of the United
States to low-tax locations abroad, but evidence from the BEA and from
the NSF especially suggest that this has not occurred. In fact, over the 1995
to 1999 period the NSF data show the traditional importance of high-tax
OECD locations has increased.
Analysis of ﬁrm-speciﬁc data from the U.S. Treasury demonstrates how
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check-the-box was adopted are compared to subsequent years. In regres-
sion analysis with 1996 tax returns, parent R&D contributed more to roy-
alty payments to U.S. parents than it did to aﬃliate earnings and proﬁts. In
2002, however, the importance of parent R&D had switched in these two
regressions, with it now playing a larger role in earnings and proﬁts relative
to royalties. That outcome is consistent with the tax avoidance strategies
explained in section 3.2. Also, the relative importance of cost-sharing pay-
ments rose over this period, relative to both royalties and earnings and
proﬁts. Cost-sharing payments from aﬃliates in Ireland and from pure tax
havens (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and Luxembourg) are particularly
signiﬁcant, both economically and statistically. Thus, the ability to carry
out research and development in the aﬃliate does not appear to be a key
prerequisite for the successful pursuit of this strategy, and alleged pressures
to relocate research and development activity abroad for tax reasons have
not been so compelling.
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